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A Mysterious Case of Missing Value 
Earl Conee 
University of Rochester 
1. The Problem  
Our topic is a difficult sort of choice.  The choice concerns what 
to do when different evaluations conflict about what we ought to 
do.  It will be argued that the choice cannot be decided by an 
objective standard.  It will also be argued that this objective indeter-
minacy has its consolations. 
 
1.1 To highlight the distinctive problem, here is a contrasting 
example of an objectively resolvable conflict. 
E1 You have available two routes to drive home.  
You know that one route is more scenic and the 
other route takes less time.  This choice poses a 
conflict between aesthetic value for you and effi-
ciency value for you.   Though it is unusual to know 
this, you also happen to know that nothing of any 
sort of value except your own interests is relevant 
to this choice.   Thus, you know that it does not 
make any moral difference which route you take, it 
makes no legal difference; it makes no difference to 
others’ well being, and so forth.  You wonder whe-
ther the extra traveling enjoyment is worth the extra 
time. You ask yourself, “Which route should I 
take?” 
There is an important interpretive question regarding E1: What 
does your use there of “should” mean? In the view that I take about 
“should” and  “ought” evaluations, they are about optimizing.  The 
view is this: 
The Best View (TBV) What “should” or “ought” 
to be done is the best of the alternatives, by the 
pertinent standards for being an alternative and for 
being the best.  The pertinent standards are those 
1
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that are at stake in the semantically relevant con-
text.1   
We can apply TBV to our story E1.  Since only your self-interest is 
at stake, your question about what route you “should” take is about 
the values for you.  It is about comparing how your well-being is 
served by your taking the most scenic route, versus how your well-
being is served by your taking the quickest route.  You ought, for 
the sake of your self-interest, to take the route that is best for you.  
So the question can be rephrased,  “Which route would be the best 
one for me?”  If it is a tie on this evaluative dimension, then neither 
is the best and neither is the one you should take.   
It might be easy for you to figure out which route benefits you 
more; it might be difficult or even impossible.  The fact about value 
for you is what answers your question, whatever its epistemic 
availability to you.   
The value for you of the two ways to drive home is the standard 
that this question makes pertinent in these circumstances.  It has 
an objective answer.  The answer is settled by the truth about the 
1Decades ago Aaron Sloman made a proposal similar to TBV, in 
“’Ought’ and ‘Better’”, Mind LXXIX no. 315 (July 1970) 385-394.  
One modest difference is that Sloman takes some uses of “ought” 
not to be covered by the proposal.  He excludes uses for expressing 
preferences and for proclaiming metaphysical absolutes (ibid, 
Section G).  In my view TBV covers all meaningful uses of 
“ought.”  (Though it does not matter here, I take the same idea to 
apply to “ought to be” sentences, such as predictions: “It ought to 
be raining by this afternoon.” The meaning accords with TBV.  In 
a typical context the sentence says that rain falling by this afternoon 
is part of the epistemically best future.) As in any other case, uses 
of “ought” that voice preferences or make metaphysical procla-
mations have contexts that set standards for the relevant sort of 
alternatives and for being the best of them.  If their contexts do 
not do this, then the uses lack determinate meaning. 
TBV is a version of what has more recently become a standard 
semantic view about “ought” sentences.  For an overview and part-
ial defense of the standard semantic view see,  “The best we can 
(expect to) get? Challenges to the classic semantics for deontic 
modals” by Kai von Fintel, web-posted at  
http://web.mit.edu/fintel/fintel-2012-apa-ought.pdf. 
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greatest value for you.  If you know which one would be better for 
you, then you know which route you should take. 
It is important for what follows to emphasize that this sort of 
value is familiar to us.  We understand the notion of being best for 
a person.  There are serious philosophical issues about what is good 
for a person.  Perhaps it is just the person’s pleasure, or perhaps 
factors like improvements in the person’s virtue, knowledge, or 
opportunities for free choices, can also make an alternative better 
for a person.  The question of what is bad for a person is equally 
non-trivial.  But this issue of what determines value for a person is 
something that we understand well enough to pursue it philo-
sophically.  The understanding shows that we have some grip on 
the value that is at stake.  Our grasp is sufficient for us to be able 
to ponder the issue and to argue about it.  
 
1.2 Now let’s consider a more problematic sort of conflict.  Our 
first illustration will be a conflict between self-interest and another 
person’s interest.  Here is an example: 
E2 Sam is walking through an isolated area of a 
large city park.  He sees a man who is clearly lost.  
The man seems confused and troubled.  Sam is on 
his way to catch a train.  He has no time to spare.  
If he misses the train, he will miss a golden oppor-
tunity to interview for a better job.  Sam sees that 
he ought, for the other man’s sake, to stay there to 
give kind assistance to the man, even though this 
will result in Sam’s missing the train.   Sam also sees 
that he ought, for the sake of his own welfare, to 
keep going to make it to his interview, helping the 
other man only by calling call 911 while hurrying 
onward.   
TBV, our best-alternative thesis about “ought” evaluations, makes 
relevant two bests. Sam’s alternative that is best for the other man 
is for Sam to stay and help him.  So by TBV, for the other man’s 
sake Sam ought to stay.  Sam’s alternative that is best for Sam is for 
him not to stay in the park, letting him catch the train.  So by TBV, 
for Sam’s sake he ought to hurry onward.  
When there is a conflict between the choices favored by differ-
ent evaluative standards, like the current conflict between the 
interests of different people, making a selection on the basis of the 
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evaluations requires some sort of ranking.  One ranking that we 
sometimes hope to find is an authoritative and conclusive ranking of 
our alternatives.  This sort of resolution would give us an objective 
answer.  It would be an answer that is determined by the relevant 
facts and circumstances, as measured by the relevant value.  In oth-
er words, we hope to find an answer that is objective in the same 
way that the answer to the question of which route home is best 
for you is objective.  We might put this aspiration by saying that we 
would like to find out which of the “ought” evaluations “overrides” 
the others.  We might equally well say that we are seeking the 
“ought” that “outweighs” the others, or the one that “ought to be 
taken, all things considered.” By invoking one or another such 
expression we seek to formulate a question about a comprehensive 
and authoritative evaluation that resolves the conflict.  
Such phrases can seem to us to express what we seek.  But what 
does any of this language really mean? 
TBV tells us that any correct “ought” evaluation singles out an 
alternative that is the best in some way.  So if TBV is right, then 
for any “overriding ought” that could resolve the conflict, there 
must be a relevant sort of best.  Therefore, in order to understand 
any of these sentences about “ought” evaluations modified by  
“overriding” or “outweighing,” we must ask: What sort of value 
determines the relevant way of being best? 
This is the value that is missing.  We unable to identify what 
evaluations it makes, because we do not understand what the value 
is.   In fact, its total obscurity is ample reason to doubt that any 
such value exists.  Consequently, any impression we have that we 
understand the intended “ought” evaluation is a mirage.2  We shall 
2 In section III of ”The Ethics of Belief” (Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 3. (May, 2000), pp. 667-695) 
Richard Feldman defends a similar thesis.  He does so in terms of 
denying the intelligibility of the notion of “just plain ought.”  (See 
note 6 below for a discussion of that phrase.) The principal novel 
contributions of the present work are to defend its version of the 
thesis by bringing TBV to bear on the topic, to try out the likeliest 
candidates for the meaning of “ought, all things considered” and 
“overridingly ought” and object to the candidates, and to propose 
consolations for those who acknowledge the semantic emptiness 
of such phrases. 
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also see that even if TBV is not correct, we do not understand what 
makes some sort of ought “override.”  This lack of understanding 
cannot be proven.  But we shall observe that the likeliest accounts 
of the idea do not succeed.  We shall then see some easily made 
mistakes underlying our inclination to think that we do know what 
this evaluation is.  
2. “Override” 
2.1 Here is an initially promising idea about the identity of the 
evaluative dimension that determines which alternatives are “over-
ridingly best.”  The idea is that this value is the strength of the prac-
tical reasons that are involved.  This reading sounds good.  After 
all, the question for someone in an “ought” conflict is a practical 
question about how to act.  The conflicting evaluations give 
differing sorts of reasons for acting in differing ways.  It can seem 
that what needs comparing is the strength of these differing rea-
sons as practical reasons. Thus, the sought-after comprehensive 
and authoritative evaluation of the reasons seems to be a job for 
the weights that practical rationality assigns to the alternatives.   
The strength of practical reasons turns out not to be what we 
seek.   Practical reason does set a standard.   But that standard turns 
out to be a competing evaluative dimension.   It enters into “ought” 
conflicts on a par with other evaluations.  It cannot authoritatively 
resolve them.  An example will bring this out.  
E3 What Sally reflectively values most highly is 
leading a life in which she creates a significant leg-
acy of accomplishment.  On reflection Sally est-
eems this sort of life a great deal more than 
alternative sorts of lives.  She believes with justify-
cation that an artistic career as a devoted sculptor 
would be by far the best way for her to have such a 
legacy. Sally sees that given her settled reflective 
values, this is the choice that she has by far the best 
practical reason to take.  But she also foresees that 
the choice would be disadvantageous to her well-
being.  The art would be difficult to appreciate and 
not widely enjoyed.  Her life as a sculptor would be 
financially precarious and it would not be well 
regarded by her family or friends.  Sally also sees 
that she would have a career that would be more 
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comfortable, secure, and approved, if she were to 
become an accountant who had sculpture as a hob-
by. She realizes that she would enjoy that life 
considerably more and would have no severe 
regrets. 
Sally’s alternative as a dedicated sculptor is markedly favored by her 
considered values. All of the credible views of what a person’s 
practical reasons favor made this fact decisive.  In any credible view 
of what our practical reasons are, they endorse a decision that is 
clearly favored by the agent’s stable considered values as they 
evaluate her options from her perspective.3 
We get a conflicting result when we apply the standard of self-
interest.  To optimize her well-being, Sally ought instead to choose 
the accounting career with a sculpturing hobby. That way of life 
would be part of the life that she foresees would work out best for 
her.   
Now we have a conflict of “ought” evaluations between the 
verdicts of practical reason and self-interest.  Suppose that Sally 
sees that one ought to be done to follow practical reason and the 
other alternative ought to be done for the sake of self-interest.  Sally 
might seek a resolution by attempting to inquire – “Which of these 
evaluations is overriding in this case?”   As an attempt to pose an 
“override” question concerning conflicting “ought” evaluations, 
this is as sensible and apt as such attempts ever are.  Yet it cannot 
be that Sally is asking what she rationally ought to do.  Sally already 
knows the answer to that question.  She is trying to ask something 
about how that answer compares to the verdict of self-interest.  
Thus, practical reason, so conceived, is not the sought-after author-
itative resolving evaluation. 
We could insist that what we will count as “practical reason” 
must, among other things, authoritatively decide any conflict 
among “oughts.”   In other words, we could insist that what we are 
3 This is an implication of views according to which following 
practical reason consists in maximizing expected utility.  It is also 
an inplication of views according to which satisficing can be 
practically rational, as long as what is favored is good enough and 
the relevant “utility” is understood to measure the agent’s reflective 
values. 
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willing count as “favored by practical reason” must be what we 
would call “overriding.”   
Well, we could insist.  The trouble would be that, in order to 
get what we would be demanding, we would have to be able to 
understand how any account of practical reason could supply an 
“overriding” sort of verdict.  Yet we cannot understand that.  Take 
any of the views according to which practical reason favors 
whatever is favored by the agent’s own considered values.  What 
sort of “quality’” does that evaluation have that could “override” 
by being more “important,” “authoritative,” or “ultimate” than the 
values measured by other standards, such as morality and self-
interest?   What is it about some sort of practical reason that makes 
it “win out”?  In fact, we do not even understand that question. 
The point is not that someone in Sally’s position could sensibly 
wonder whether the standard of practical reason really does 
“override” the standard of self-interest.  The point is not that we 
understand some further evaluative question that we have Sally 
asking, but the proposed answer to it remains open to doubt.  The 
putative further question and answer about this “override” are not 
open; they are empty.  The problem is that neither question nor 
answer is intelligible.  We see an opposition between two standards, 
but we see too little more. We lack any understanding of the 
sought-after “override” evaluation.  Calling this sort of evaluation 
“practical reason” does not help us to understand what it is.   
TBV sharpens our focus on this problem.  TBV prompts us to 
consider the exact way in which an alternative would have to be 
best, in order to be the one that “overridingly ought” to be taken.  
Our question remains: What is authoritative about that value, 
whether it is called “the standard of practical reason” or not?  What 
practical reasons clearly do is to give a kind of rationality to choices 
of conduct.  But what we seek is to understand how they could 
“outweigh” or “have more importance” or “override” reasons 
from other evaluative dimensions like the moral and the aesthetic. 
On reflection we do not see what the further feature could be. 
 
2.2 Here is another approach to making sense of the “override.”  
A perspective with Kantian roots has it that we ought to perform 
some acts, not for the sake of any specific end, but simply because 
we are agents.  The evaluation is determined by our sheer agency.   
That might suggest that the standard it sets is somehow the most 
fundamental one.  It might be thought that this fundamental status 
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makes the standard decisive in resolving “ought” conflicts. To give 
this broad idea its due, we should consider two interpretations.   
 
2.2.1 The first reading  - ‘Override 2a’ - is that a standard that is set 
by one’s agency overrides because meeting this agency-provided 
standard is doing what is required in order to continue to be an 
agent at all.   The standard requires taking an alternative that 
preserves one’s existence as an agent.  
If that is the idea, then the standard does not even apply in 
most conflict cases.  In most conflicts, whichever act is performed 
the person continues to be an agent.   So none of the conflicting 
alternatives would be favored by this agency-provided standard.  By 
Override 2a, then, nothing overridingly ought to be done.  Yet 
“ought” conflicts where the agent’s agency continues, whatever 
choice is made, can be as severe and as distressing as any. 
Occasionally one has a choice where, if an alternative is taken, 
then one’s agency ceases.  One dies or one otherwise becomes 
utterly incapable of acting.  Even in such circumstances it is obs-
cure how some “ought” that favors doing what is required for 
continued agency would “take priority” or “override.”  In extreme 
circumstances where the conflicting “ought,” the one that favors 
one’s death, was the “ought” of morality, taking that alternative and 
dying would somehow be morally worth doing.  When an act is 
that morally momentous, it is entirely unclear what might make 
staying alive and preserving one’s agency inevitably “win” this sort 
of competition and “outweigh” the morally necessity act. 
 
2.2.2 The other interpretive possibility that we should consider is 
that a Kantian reading of “overridingly ought” is not about 
remaining an agent.  Instead it is about some irreducible special 
requirement that is supposed to be imposed just by virtue of our 
being agents. This is “Override 2b.”  The alleged requirement 
would make true claims like this: “Simply as an agent, I ought to 
do this.”   
When the Kantian interpretation is understood in this way, we 
can see that the requirement is subject to a familiar problem.  Any 
such agency “ought” enters the fray as a competitor rather than as 
an authoritative resolution.  As with aesthetic standards, moral 
ones, legal ones, prudential ones, and the rest, other “oughts” are 
sometimes in conflict with it.  The conflict gives rise to the compar-
ative questions that we are trying to understand.  On the present 
assumptions, an instance of the questions can be asked as follows: 
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“Simply as an agent, I ought to do one thing. But for the sake of 
my artistic efforts as a poet, I ought to do another thing, and for 
my own sake, I ought to do a third thing. ”  This situation sets up 
the aspiration for an “overriding ought” as well as any other 
situation does.  It is quite unclear how the fact that as an agent one 
ought to do something could be any more comparatively decisive 
than is the fact that doing something is aesthetically best or the fact 
that doing something is favored by self-interest. 
 
2.3 What else could the “override” be?  David Copp has argued 
that the purported override relation does not exist.  In preparation 
for so arguing he describes what the relation would have to be.4  It 
might be thought that the description at least provides the meaning 
that we have been seeking for an “overriding,” or “outweighing,” 
or “all things considered,” sort of “ought”.   
Copp describes the purported overriding standard that he 
argues not to exist as the “supreme” standard.  He explains this as 
being what he calls the “normatively most important” standard.  
This is “Override 3.”  It might be thought that this characterization 
identifies the relevant override relation. 
These descriptive phrases make no understandable desig-
nation.  We have several contextually definite concepts of “supre-
macy” and “normative importance.”  In various contests such 
words modify various familiar ratings – legal supremacy, moral 
importance, motivational supremacy, and the like.  But we lack any 
notion of “absolute supremacy” or “pure normative import.”  
Copp’s unmodified uses of “supreme” and “normatively most 
important” signify nothing more definite than does our term 
“overriding” itself.  We cannot understand the “overriding” 
evaluation in these terms, in the absence of any information about 
some specific way in which the overriding evaluation is “supreme,” 
or “of most normative important.”  In the absence of this further 
information, Copp’s descriptions do not give us the understanding 
that we seek.  
 
4 David Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity 
of Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997) pp. 86-106.  Copp’s 
argument against an override relation is criticized in ways that seem 
to me to be effective, in section 5 of Owen McLeod’s ”Just Plain 
’Ought,’” The Journal of Ethics 6 (2002) pp. 269-291. 
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2.4 Now let’s try out the idea that it is morality that sets the 
overarching standard. This idea has something going for it.  Many 
of us have a sense that morality has an especially high status, 
though it is not clear what this height amounts to.  Nevertheless, 
an inchoate sense of a superiority of the moral might be thought to 
tell us that the moral standard is the one that resolves the conflicts 
authoritatively.5  This is “Override 4.” 
The trouble for this idea is not new.  Morality is in the 
competition; it is not the authoritative resolution.  We can see that 
an "ought" conflict can remain in need of resolution, even after the 
moral alternative has been explicitly acknowledged.  For example: 
E4 Beatrice tells us, “I happen to know something 
about the politics of my friend’s rival for the job 
that they both seek. But I have no moral excuse to 
disclose that political orientation to my friend’s 
potential employer.  The disclosure would 
predictably activate a bias in the potential employer, 
giving my friend the advantage.  I morally ought 
not to do this and induce the employer to make the 
selection on an immoral basis.  Yet it would be very 
good for my friend to have that job.  My friend’s 
well-being is very important to me.  And I am sure 
that my friend would do the job capably.”  Beatrice 
asks, “What should I do?” 
Someone in a situation like this has a difficult choice to make.   Yet 
it is not difficult for Beatrice to discern what she morally ought to 
do.  In her posing of the question, she explicitly acknowledges the 
answer to the question of what he morally ought to do.  So she 
cannot be conceiving of her further inquiry as raising that moral 
question.  Yet this is as good an example as any of a request for a 
further, “overriding ought”. 
 
2.5 Here is a further interpretive idea about what we have been 
calling the “all things considered” or the “overriding” evaluation. 
We often make unmodified use of “ought.”6  The new thought is 
5 I thank Troy Cross for this suggestion. 
6 In Owen McLeod’s ”Just Plain ‘Ought,’”, op. cit., he argues that 
there is an “ought” evaluation that is thereby fully expressed – what 
he calls “Just Plain Ought” (JPO).  McLeod contends that JPO 
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that using the term this way sometimes expresses the overlapping 
of all applicable evaluative standards and this is the “ought, all 
things considered” or “overriding ought.”  That is, we “ought, all 
evaluations resolve conflicts between moral, prudential and the 
other “qualified ought” evaluations.   He holds that the qualified 
evaluations make contributuions to a JPO evaluation that are 
analogous to the contributions that W. D. Ross asserts that prima 
facie duties make toward all things considered moral duties.  This 
idea would be quite helpful if it worked out.  It does not.  We do 
not understand a genuinely  unqualified JPO evaluation.  One 
problem for our understanding it is this.  If TBV is right, then the 
“ought” in JPO would have to select an evaluative dimension, in 
order to single out the best alternative on that dimension.   It is 
quite obscure what the dimension might be.  It cannot be “just 
plain value” because there is no such thing.  There is value that 
contributes to self-interest, value that contributes morally, 
monetary value, epistemic value, and more.  But there is no 
unmodified sort of value. (See section 2.6 below for discussion of 
the idea that there is a generic sort of value.) Yet if JPO is not about 
an unmodified sort of value, then it is entirely unclear what value it 
invokes.  If it is any familiar evaluative dimension, then JPO would 
be another way to make an “ought” evaluation that participates in 
the conflict.  The evaluation could not become an authoritative 
resolution by being expressible as “just plain ought”, rather than 
“morally ought”, or “rationally ought” or whatever it was.  If it is 
not any familiar evaluation, then it is quite unclear what it is.  
A second problem for JPO does not depend on TBV.  It is very 
hard to see how a JPO could be decisive in an authoritative way.  It 
could be comprehensive.  But all of the particular evaluations are 
comprehensive.  For example, aesthetic “ought” evaluations take 
into account moral factors.  Mostly moral factors are aesthetically 
neutral.  But at times something that makes an act morally better, 
perhaps a graceful and modest way of accepting a gift, makes it 
aesthetically better as well.  The problem concerns how the JPO 
evaluation, whatever it was, could subordinate the rest.  A response 
like the following seems frequently to be available, entirely sensible, 
and unanswerable: “Granted, I just plain ought to do A.  But for 
my own good, it would be better for me not to do A.  Why does 
the JPO ‘win’ this comparison, or any other?  In fact, what does 
‘victory’ mean here?”   
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things considered” or “overridingly ought” to do something when 
doing it is our best alternative according to every evaluation that 
rates our alternatives, moral, prudential, legal, and the rest.7  This 
is “Override 5.” 
One asset of Override 5 is that it gives us thoroughly under-
standable statements.  They just state that all “ought” evaluations 
coincide in favoring one and the same alternative.  So we 
understand them on the Override 5 interpretation.  Another 
strength of Override 5 is that on occasions when all of the stand-
ards that we consider do coincide on one alternative, it is 
particularly easy for us to affirm it as the alternative that “ought” 
to be taken.  Suppose that I realize that it is a fine time for me to 
do some housecleaning, but I am procrastinating.  You might tell 
me,  “Given how you like a clean house, it is in your own best 
interest to do the house cleaning.  Additionally, you promised your 
wife you’d do it and the house will look its best.  You have no 
competing moral tasks to accomplish. There’s just no question 
about it, you ought to do it.”  When we use “ought” like that, we 
need not have any particular standard in mind.  Yet clearly we do 
understand what we are saying.  So maybe we are then applying this 
coinciding idea.  
It is not finally credible, however, that the coinciding interpret-
ation is the meaning of “ought, all things considered” or 
“overridingly ought” as we are trying to understand them.  Over-
ride 5 has an unbelievable implication concerning the sorts of 
conflicts that we have been discussing. Whenever the evaluations 
conflict, the standards do not all coincide.  So in any case of 
conflicting evaluative standards, the coinciding interpretation 
implies that none of the alternatives “ought” to be taken.  In any 
conflict the answer to the question, “What I ought I to do?”—
understood by Override 5 as the question of what all standards 
favor—would always have the same answer, namely, “Nothing.”  
And it would be easy for us to see that this is the correct answer.  
All that we would have to do is to note the conflict and understand 
that what we mean requires unanimity.  The unanimity would be 
rare.  Any person’s interests constitute an evaluative dimension.  So 
whenever an alternative does not do best by any one person, it 
would not turn out that any alternative “ought, all things 
considered” or  “overridingly ought” to be taken.  But it is not 
7 I thank Toby Handfield for this suggestion. 
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believable either that this negative answer to the intended question 
holds in all conflicts or that we can find out the negative answer 
just by noting the conflict.  
The Override 5 meaning is a good idea about other phrases, 
such as “unambiguously ought” and “incontestably ought.”  Those 
phrases suggest that all evaluations agree.  In contrast, what we seek 
from an “ought, all things considered” or an “overridingly ought” 
evaluation is, among other things, one that selects alternatives in at 
least some conflicts.  The general meaning of the term “override” 
supports this aspiration.  Generally, the overriding consideration 
takes a side—it favors some authoritative verdict.8 
 
2.6 Another interpretive approach combines all evaluations.  In-
stead of requiring them to coincide, the new interpretation relies 
on a “generic value” that they are to share.  Alternatives are to have 
some quantity of this generic value.  It is to be the sum of all of the 
contributions that they make to each specific sort of value.  Apply-
ing TBV, the alternative that “overridingly ought” or “ought, all 
things considered” to be taken, is the one (if any) that is relevantly 
the best: it has the most generic value.   
Here is the thought in somewhat more detail.  Value is to be a 
generic magnitude.  Its specifications are to include all of the evalu-
ative types that can enter into “ought” conflicts.  Thus, some gen-
eric value would be moral value, some would be aesthetic value, 
some would be value from self-interest, some would be epistemic 
value, and so on.  The generic value of an alternative is to be the 
sum of the quantities of all of its specific sorts of value.  The 
alternative that someone “ought, all things considered” to take is 
the one that has most generic value.  This is “Override 6.”   
Here is an illustration of how Override 6 is supposed to work.  
An alternative that has great moral value by being heroic would 
thereby have great generic value.  If its alternatives have less generic 
value from morality and from all other sorts of value, then on the 
Override 6 reading it is the alternative that “overridingly ought” to 
be taken.  However, the heroic alternative could have even greater 
negative generic value by being terribly costly to the agent’s self-
interest, while some other alternative is generically neutral. If so, 
then the heroic choice is not generically most valuable and on the 
8 See, for example, the definition of “override” in Dictionary.com: 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/override 
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Override 6 reading it is not the one that “overridingly ought” to be 
taken.  
Override 6 does not succeed as an interpretation.  It depends 
on the existence of a thoroughly obscure sort of value.   To 
illustrate the obscurity, epistemic contributions would have to be 
comparable in “generic value” to aesthetic contributions.  But we 
have no idea of what might make it the case that, say, the aesthetic 
good of knitting a handsome scarf is of more “generic value,” or 
less, or an equal amount, to the epistemic good of, say, deriving of 
a moderately difficult theorem.  Furthermore, in order to cover all 
potential “ought” conflicts, generic value must subsume many 
other disparate values, such as financial value, communal value, and 
entertainment value.  It is not credible that all of the mentioned 
sorts of value are commensurate types of one value.  We have no 
notion of such value.  It is just as opaque to us as “generic physical 
magnitude” would be, if this were alleged to be a quantity that 
includes as commensurate types all specific physical magnitudes 
such as distance and mass.  Yet Override 6 needs some such notion 
of value.  So Override 6 does not give us an intelligible reading of 
“overridingly ought.” 
 
2.7 One more interpretive idea deserves consideration.  We would 
like to employ an override relation that we understand, in order to 
resolve the conflicts.  We do not seem to have an existing candidate 
that pans out.  Perhaps we can create by stipulation the meaning of 
“override” that we seek.  Morality matters a lot to most of us.  Ex-
ploiting this fact, we can stipulate that what we “overridingly 
ought” to do is always what we morally ought to do. 
This stipulation does not give us what we seek. A stipulated 
meaning only changes our expressive resources.  It does not create 
a new evaluation. Yet for “overridingly ought” to do what it is 
supposed to do, we need a new one.  We have seen that morality 
and the other familiar evaluations do not work.  Putting the point 
another way, we have not been looking merely for some way to use 
“overridingly ought” that we understand and that makes a definite 
selection in a conflict.  We seek a meaning of “overridingly ought” 
that does these things and more. We seek a sort of override that 
assesses alternatives authoritatively across the various evaluative 
dimensions.  Yet we have no grip on an authoritative compre-
hensive evaluation.  So we do not have available for any purpose, 
stipulative definition or otherwise, a meaning of the sort that we 
seek.   
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3. Taking Stock  
We have not found anything that we can recognize as an authori-
tative standard to resolve “ought” conflicts.  The reasons from 
different evaluations are irredeemably disparate.  The trouble is not 
that we have no way to compare them.  The trouble is that we have 
too many ways.  We have one way for each type of evaluation of 
our alternatives.  For any case, each aesthetically substantial 
factor has some moral significance – morally positive, negative, 
or neutral; each morally substantial factor has some level of 
aesthetic significance – aesthetically positive, negative, or 
neutral; and so on.   Applying one or another of these familiar 
ratings is all that we can do in order to make comparative 
evaluations.  We wish that there were some comprehensive ul-
timate standard.  But finally we do not understand what it would 
be. 
4. Explanations of an Illusion  
Many of us have thought that we understood phrases like “ought, 
all things considered” and “overridingly ought.”  The present view 
is that we do not understand them.  That is mysterious.  Our im-
pression of understanding is not some shallow error.  It is not like 
mistaking for a meaningful English word a vaguely familiar bit of 
gibberish like “brillig” or “slithy” from Lewis Carroll’s nonsense 
poem, “Jabberwocky”.9  The view is that phrases like “ought, all 
things considered” and “overridingly ought” as wholes do not 
combine intelligibly. Though the semantic obstacle is considerably 
less blatant, it is otherwise quite similar to trying to understand the 
phrases, “ought, no things considered” and “indeterminately 
ought.” The modifiers thwart the applicability of the verb, rather 
than restricting it intelligibly.  Yet some of us have an impression 
of understanding.  A credible defense of the view requires 
9 Noteably, the word “chortle” from “Jabberwocky” did became a 
meaningful English word.  It seems to have acquired a meaning by 
sounding enough like the already meaningful words  “chuckle” and 
“snort” to take on something like their conjoined meaning.   (See 
the Online Etymology Dictionary:  
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=chortle). 
Our problem phrases with “ought” are not like that.  No combined 
meaning is in the offing. 
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explaining the illusion behind an apparent grasp of “ought, all 
things considered” and “overridingly ought.”  Two explanations 
are available.   
 
4.1 First, we can mistakenly think we have a concept on the basis 
of attempting to single out the concept using properties that we 
intend it to have.  Suppose that someone finds a conflict between 
her self-interested alternative and her moral one.  She is moved to 
ask what she “ought, all things considered” to do.  The person may 
be conceiving of the evaluation that she seeks as the one that 
accomplishes two things.  First, it “weighs” the moral and 
prudential considerations and every other specific sort of evaluative 
consideration.  That is, it measures their strength as reasons along 
some dimension that is inclusive with respect to these other sorts 
of evaluations.  It does this without any indeterminacy that pre-
vents selecting a best alternative. 
The second feature of what the “ought, all things considered” 
is intended to do is to provide an authoritative factually determined 
resolution of the conflict.  That is, the sought-after evaluative 
dimension is further conceived as one that solves the problem of 
choice that the conflict poses with authority and objectively.  Put-
ting these things together, the overriding ‘ought’ is intended to be 
the one that provides an objective authoritative ranking of the 
alternatives that resolves the conflict. 
Thinking about these uses of “all things considered, ought” or 
“overridingly ought” in some such way can seem to identify some 
particular evaluative standard.  But that impression is illusory.  Fur-
ther reflection reveals that this much is not enough to give the 
question a meaning.  The phrases describe some understandable 
evaluation only if it singles out some understandable sort of 
“weight” and “authority.”   What sort is it?  It is not any familiar 
specific weight like moral weight.  Moral weight is only one among 
the factors that are supposed to be given “their due.”  We are now 
seeking what this other ‘weight’ is, the one that is supposed to 
determine the due contributions to an authoritative conclusive re-
solution.  For the same reason, it is not the weight of practical rea-
sons, or reasons of any other familiar kind.  The fact is that we 
cannot further identify the ‘weight.’  And what could be its 
‘authority’?  It is not authoritative by being morally decisive.  Again, 
it is not just the moral evaluation stated over again.  We have seen 
that morality does not arbitrate as intended- rather, only some 
“due” contribution from moral considerations enters in.  For the 
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same reason, it is not ‘authoritative’ by making any other familiar 
evaluation.  Thus, the abstract constraints of accomplishing some 
“comprehensive weighing” and “conclusive authoritative 
resolution” do not yield any understandable evaluation. 
 
4.2 TBV helps to identify a second source of illusion that can 
obscure the lack of content to “all things considered ought,” 
“overridingly ought,” and the like.  TBV tells us that for any 
meaningful use of “ought,” something contextual provides a 
standard for being relevantly best.  The provision can be explicit, 
as when we say, “morally ought.”   Very often the standard is not 
explicit.  If TBV is correct, then a tacit contextual designation of a 
standard plays a frequent role in how we understand “ought,” on 
the frequent occasions when we do get it.  Since our compre-
hension of ‘ought’ claims often relies on this, we are disposed to 
find contextual cues that fix the standard.  So, when a use of 
“ought” is not explicitly modified, we are inclined to seek some 
familiar standard that the context somehow calls for.  We usually 
succeed.  For instance, when someone asks, “How ought I to open 
this package?” it is usually clear that the question concerns being 
most efficient, or it is clear that it concerns best protecting the 
contents.  For another example, when someone asks, “How ought 
I to identify the heirs in my will?" it is usually clear that the question 
is one of maximal legal efficacy.  In general, usually the relevant 
evaluative dimension is readily specified if we consider the matter. 
This interpretive inclination is not disengaged when “all things 
considered” or “overriding” is added to “ought.” We expect con-
text to do its usual work.  This is true despite the fact that, as we 
have seen, we could not actually find any standard that it selected 
if we tried to do so.  We might even think we could find it if we 
sought it carefully enough.  The serious interpersonal matters at 
stake in some conflicts tend to bring morality to mind as a prime 
candidate.  On other occasions, our concern for an agent makes a 
prudential standard the one that looms large in our thinking.  In 
still other cases, the desire for a clear-cut conclusion to a conflict 
inclines us to prefer an evaluation that decisively favors some one 
alternative.  In these ways it can appear to us that we can specify a 
definite evaluative measure for the “ought, all things considered,” 
“overriding ought,” or the like.   
Further thought undercuts this appearance.  We can explicitly 
acknowledge the implications of the particular standard that we are 
inclined to favor, and then try again to ask the problematic sort of 
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question.  Suppose that we are deeply concerned about the welfare 
of some agent.  We are inclined to resolve a conflict by recom-
mending whatever is most prudent for her to do. We can intelligibly 
affirm that the alternative that we recommend definitely outweighs 
the others on the prudential grounds that matter most to us.  But 
we still cannot fathom the “overriding ought” question: “Is this 
priority that we ourselves have also objectively correct?  Does it 
identify the alternative that she ought, all things considered, to 
take?  Is it what she overridingly ought to do?”  We do not under-
stand what any such question asks.  
5. A Consolation  
This lack of comprehension is not appealing.  We sometimes find 
that we cannot take every alternative that in some way or other we 
ought to take.  On these occasions, it can be discouraging to think 
that we do not even understand how the conflict could be object-
ively resolved.  We still have to make a choice. 
It is some consolation that the emptiness of ‘overriding ought’ 
does not deprive those who confront such conflicts with a rational 
basis for deciding.  Our reflective concerns give good reasons to 
make choices.  Usually we care on reflection more about some of 
the conflicting evaluations than others. This concern can be 
capable of surviving scrupulous critical scrutiny.  Choosing in 
accordance with this sort of priority is a way to make a rational 
choice.    
This rational assessment can be expressed with “ought.”  We 
can say that choosing a certain alternative is what someone 
‘ought’ to do, in that it best meets the person’s reflectively stable 
priorities.  As with all of the uses of “ought” that we understand, 
this one applies a particular standard. The problematic compar-
ative question is not thereby given content, much less answered.  
To see this, we can note that one who has ascertained the 
reflectively preferred choice can raise the problematic question 
with as much apparent sense as usual.  Consider:  
E5 Gauguin Prime is a fictional artist who we 
stipulate to be reflective in a certain way about a 
major choice.  In preparation for the choice, Gau-
guin Prime critically scrutinizes his priorities.  Upon 
due reflection he finds that his settled values favor 
devoting himself to artistic endeavors, even at the 
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expense of fulfilling family responsibilities. Gau-
guin Prime is not comfortable with taking that 
alternative.   He observes, “A thorough devotion to 
my painting is favored by my considered values.  I 
see that this is not what I morally ought to do and 
that it is not best for the people closest to me.”  He 
asks, “What ought I to do, all things considered?”   
This attempt to pose a question that would resolve the conflict is 
as understandable as any typical “ought, all things considered” 
inquiry. Yet Gauguin Prime would not be seeking to rate his 
alternatives by his underlying reflective priorities.  That rating is 
already established for him as part of his basis for attempting to ask 
a further question.  The question seeks a further sort of standard.  
Reflective values that can rationalize choices do not furnish that 
standard.  Nothing does.  It is an illusory question that could not 
have a correct answer.   
6. Objection  
An objection should be considered.  Its discussion should add clar-
ity to the view advocated here.  
 
6.1 It might be thought that there must be an override relation that 
can resolve “ought” conflicts, because we know its application in 
some cases.  For instance, we know how it applies in the following 
case. 
E6 Etiquette favors Maria’s making a polite and 
graceful departure from a dinner party.  But Maria 
has just recalled a late evening appointment to 
mentor a troubled teenager.  She will clearly miss 
this appointment unless she catches the next sub-
way.  She can just barely make it.  So although Maria 
ought, as a matter of etiquette, to depart politely 
and gracefully, she ought, as a matter of morality, 
to rush away.   
The objection alleges that in cases like this it is quite clear that Maria 
overridingly ought to do the moral thing.  We know that she ought, 
all things considered, to do that.  We know that the moral “ought” 
overrides here.  The objection concludes that since we have a suf-
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ficient grasp of an overriding relation to discern its application in 
such cases, the relation exists and we have some awareness of it. 
 
6.2 In a case like this we do succeed in making sense of an override 
relation between the alternatives.  But in such cases different 
evaluative dimensions do not compete.  In our example of Art, the 
two evaluations are fundamentally moral.  Evaluations of etiquette 
often assess minor matters of morality.  The “weights” of reasons 
that we discern in examples like E6 compare a morally significant 
factor with a morally minor factor.  The relevant ‘override’ is just a 
matter of something clearly having greater moral significance.  This 
gives no evidence for the existence of a comprehensive override 
relation that compares different evaluative dimensions. 
This reply might seem to take advantage of the particular sort 
of conflict in our example.  It does not.  Only in cases like this one 
is an apparent conflict between evaluations resolvable by a well-
understood sort of override.  In these cases the appearance of a 
resolution is not deceptive.  The deception rather consists in an 
appearance of separate evaluative standards.  On the reading of the 
case that allows a clear resolution, only one familiar standard is 
actually at work.   
Some examples in which justice and morality appear to conflict 
are similar.  The pursuit of justice is also part of the moral en-
deavor.  So the moral standard governs the conflict and there can 
be a moral resolution.   
When the conflicting “ought” evaluations are clearly on 
different evaluative dimensions, moral, vs. aesthetic, vs. self-
interest, vs. the interest of another, and so forth, we never see what 
the agent “overridingly ought” to do.  Applying TBV, we would 
have to discover the “overridingly best” thing for the agent to do.  
We cannot make sense of that.  Suppose that self-interest slightly 
favors one choice while morality heavily favors another.  We can 
know that there is this contrast in magnitudes—a small favoring on 
the one side and a large one on the other.  This contrast can lead 
us to recommend the moral alternative.  The cost to the agent is 
small and we take morality seriously.  But this recommendation is 
not based on our apprehending any authoritative override relation 
and employing it. Without overlooking anything relevant we could 
have recommended the self-interested choice instead, with equal 
sense and equal conviction, if we had cared dearly for the agent 
while caring less about morality.  Clearly we have preferences for 
some evaluations in some cases.  What we never have is a grasp of 
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a comprehensive and authoritative sort of quality by the measure 
of which our favored choice is best.   
7. A Concluding Consolation 
The alternatives in a conflict are not rated by any resolving 
objective standard.  This absence can be found liberating.  Our sel-
ection is left open by the evaluative facts.  The choice is not beyond 
criticism.  It can be variously good or bad.  For some examples, it 
can be good by being generous, wise, healthy, courageous, tactful, 
considerate, or sensible; it can be bad by being cruel, selfish, mal-
icious, imprudent, tasteless, biased, or frivolous.  Nonetheless, in 
making the choice we cannot be rightly accused of missing some 
objective fact about what overrides.  We are free to choose a value 
to favor, with no danger that the choice makes an objective 
evaluative mistake.10 
 
10I am grateful for the cordial and helpful discussion of a draft of 
this work at the SUNY Brockport Center for Philosophic Ex-
change. 
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